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introduction
This paper examines the co n f l ic t  between private  property  
r ights of persons in the pract ice  of th e i r  occupations and the 
public in te re s t  in sta te  regulation of certa in  occupations. Part I 
explores the history of property and r ights in property. Part II 
describes how sociological,  legal and economic factors  compete 
in the arena of s ta te  and pr iva te  regulation of occupations. Part  
111 focuses on how Michigan regulates physical therapis ts ,  as an 
example of s tate  regulation of an occupation, and on how the 
issue of d irect access draws in the con f l ic t  between private  
property rights and the public in terest .  This paper concludes by 
describing what issues in today's regulatory environment involve  
the co nf l ic t  between private  r ights and the public in te res t  and 
how that co nf l ic t  is being increasingly resolved in the courts.
The importance of the presentation here of this conf l ic t  l ies  
in i ts  relevance to leg is lators  and regulators having rulemaking  
authority who seek to modify exist ing regulatory schemes or who 
seek to regulate new occupations. In the same way, the conf l ic t  
between private r ights and the public in te rest  is c r i t ic a l  to 
professional associations which seek to avoid state  regulation by 
imposing on i ts  members rules and standards designed to negate 
the need fo r  governmental regulation.
These issues are also of concern to the various in te res t  
groups which may have a stake in the regulation of an occupation.
To these in te res t  groups, the issues discussed in th is paper must 
be at the heart of any e f fo r ts  to influence the s ta te  r e g u l a t i o n  or 
deregulation of a certa in  occupation. The way the co nf l ic t  
between private  r ights and the public in te re s t  is confronted by 
public ins t i tu t ion s ,  l ike  the leg is la tu res  and the courts, and by 
private bodies, l ike  in te re s t  groups and professional  
associations, w i l l  determine not only the extent of current  
regulation but also w i l l  determine the nature and extent of fu ture  
regulation of occupations.
At the heart of s ta te  occupational l icensing of professions  
is the protection of the public in te res t .  A consti tut ional  concept, 
the public in terest  is defined w ith in  the bounds of not only the 
due process clauses of the F i f th  and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution but also the privi leges and 
immunities clause and even the preamble of the Constitution  
(Erler,  pp 4 3 -4 4 ;  Robinson, pp 6 9 -7 0 ) .
Paral le l ing protection of the public in te rest  is property and 
the evolution of property r ights in the United States. Property in 
feudal Europe or ig inal ly  meant ownership of land but gradually  
expanded under the guild system to include personal r ights to 
practice a trade. (Rubin, pp 3 3 -3 5 ) .
in American constitut ional theory, l ib e r ty  and property are 
broad concepts which the United States Supreme Court has only 
recently viewed in the context of procedural due process "as 
ar t fu l  words of l im i ta t io n  on the application of due process." 
(Robinson, p 71). As Robinson observes, the Court has been more 
concerned in recent years w ith  the procedural question of what
process is due ra ther  than in the defining of l i b e r t y  and p ro p e r ty  
( Ibid.. pp 7 1 -7 2 ) .
But, as we see from the const i tu t iona l  debates and ea r ly  
court decisions involving l ib e r ty  and property r ights ,  freedom of 
economic enterprise and the freedom to develop one's ta lents  and 
pursue one’s ends were central to consti tut ional  construction.  
(Ibid.).
in examining the impact of natural r ights jurisprudence on 
constitut ional construction, Antieau concludes that the use of the 
term "liberty" in the F i f th  Amendment "is a composite of many 
p art icu lar  r ights or freedoms" and that "the courts have gone to 
natural r ights jurisprudence when concerned w ith  specifying the 
rights" not e x p l ic i t ly  mentioned in the Constitution. (Antieau,  
165). What this means is the government cannot in te r fe re  in the 
l ives, l ib e r ty  and property of the people. ( Ibid.. p 155).
To John Locke, the leg is la tu re  is prohibited from being 
“absolutely a rb itra ry  over the l iyes and fortunes of the people." 
( Ib id .). Burlamaqui and James Otis concurred. In 1764, Otis 
argued: "No leg is la t ive  [sic], supreme or subordinate, has a right  
to make i t s e l f  arbitrary."  Thomas Jefferson and Samuel Adams 
agreed the state "was to have no arb itra ry  power over the 
citizen." ( Ibid.).
In a f f i rm in g  that the Constitution was to be interpreted in 
l ight of natural law principles, Justice Chase w r i t in g  fo r  the 
Supreme Court in Calder v Bull (1 7 9 8 )  maintained that the "people 
of the United States erected th e i r  constitut ions, or forms of 
government, to establish just ice ,  to promote the general w e l fa re ,
to secure the blessings of l ib e r ty  and to protect th e i r  persons and
property from violence." ( ib id .. pp 1 5 5 -1 5 6 .  To Justice  Chose, 
"the purposes for  which men enter  into society w i l l  determine the 
nature and terms of the social compact and as they are the 
foundation of le g is la t iv e  power, they w i l l  decide what are the 
proper objects of it ."  ( Ib id .).
In describing the natural law  principles in the U.S. 
Consitution, Justice Chase wrote:
There are certa in  v i ta l  principles in our 
f ree  Republican governments, which w i l l  
determine and overrule an apparent and 
f lagrant  abuse of le g is la t iv e  power; as to 
authorize m anifest  in ju s t ice  by posit ive  
law; or to take away that security  for  
personal l ib e r ty ,  or private  property, fo r  
the protection whereof the government was 
established. An act of the Legislature ( fo r  
I cannot call  i t  a law )  contrary to the great  
f i r s t  principles of the social compact 
cannot be considered a r ightfu l  exercise of 
leg is la t ive  authority .  ( Ibid.).
Am er ican  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  la w  tempered the natural la w  
p ro h ib i t i o n  on arb i t ra ry  governmental action by i ts  i n fu s io n  of 
substantive due process principles in  cases upholding government 
regulations. The courts have upheld reasonable regulations "when 
such regulations do not conf l ic t  w ith  any constitut ional  
inhibit ion or natural right." ( Ibid.. p 156).
There has been a marked s h i f t  in modern times from natural  
r ights to a po s it iv is t  perspective in the law, implying "a change 
in the conception of property and l iberty."  (Robinson, p 86).
Robinson argues that the “s h i f t  to posit iv ism  necessarily im p l ie s  
a diminution in the strength of r ights protection, but is has a lso 
introduced greater  potentia l  scope to d e f i n i t i o n  o f  r igh ts .3 ( i b i d .. 
p 87). He maintains that the modern concept of l ib e r ty  retains at 
least the s p ir i t  of Lockean l ib era l ism ,  meaning freedom from  
governmental in terference ,  but that "modern posit iv ism has 
transformed property into an almost f re e - fo rm  protection for  all  
manner of claims th a t jn d iv id u a ls  may maintain against the sta te  
pursuant to some 'en t i t lem ent '  conferred by contract or s ta tu tory  
instrument or some other amorphous source l ike the common law." 
( Ibid.. p 87).
How the Supreme Court treated the question of property  
rights under the due process clause of the Constitution evolved 
from a natural r ights to a p o s it iv is t  approach w ith  i ts  post-C iv i l  
War in terpre ta t ions of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Robinson, p 
73).  In substantive due process analysis, the Supreme Court 
originally  characterized occupational pursuits as l ib e r ty ,  but 
la te r  expressed them as property. ( Ibid.. p 86).
in e i t h e r  event,  evo lv ing  no t ion s  of l i b e r t y  and p ro p e r ty  are 
tempered by the role of government as the protector of rights. In 
the context of occupational pursuits, this has grown to include 
not only the protection of the right to pursue an occupation but 
also the right of the public to be protected from harm result ing  
from the pursuit of an occupation. The state seeks to p ro te c t  
that public in terest  through occupational licensing. ( Ibid.).
How the right to pursue an occupation confl ic ts  w ith  the 
public in te rest  in preventing harm result ing from a p rac t i t io ne r  s
pursuit of an occupation is the subject of th is paper. The 
approach of th is paper w i l l  include examination of th is co n f l ic t  
from a legal,  economic and sociological perspective to determine  
not only the contours of the c o n f l ic t  but also to examine the 
parameters of occupational l icensing in general in l ight  of that  
confl ic t .
1 The Evolution of Property and Rights in Property.
Occupational licensing laws in the United States can be 
traced to rules enacted in the 19th century by national societ ies  
governing physicians and lawyers. (Rubin, p 31).  How property  
rights in occupations evolved as a legal concept in the United 
States can be traced back centuries before.
As Rubin describes i t ,  the history of American law  "must be 
woven w ith  the English and European experience which preceded 
i t ,  and which continues to exert conceptual force." (Rubin, p 32).
In the i l t h  and 12th centuries, according to Rubin, social 
and economic vocational societ ies were formed, and in the 13th 
century education became the "demarcation" point for  professions, 
( ibid.). The specialized tra ining members of vocational societies  
received created so l idar i ty  among th e ir  ranks but made them 
vulnerable to uncerta int ies of the feudal economy, ( ibid.).
Later,  in the 15th century, these guild carte ls  were closely  
knit ,  re s t r ic ted  membership to those meeting str ingent education 
and other qua l i f ica t ions ,  and required members to adhere to t ight  
carte l  practices. ( Ibid.). As the feudal economies of Europe 
collapsed and freed workers from obligations to the land of th e ir
feudal lords, "[tlravel became easier,  and art isans and merchants  
were a t t rac ted  to the prospering trade centers. Unable to be 
absorbed into the re s t r ic t iv e  guild system, these individuals  
entered into competit ion w ith  the guild members." ( Ib id .).
English common law courts led the way in establishing and 
in protecting the right to earn a l iv ing. At the same t ime those 
courts came to recognize the social and economic advantages of 
competit ion w ith  principles that would "reappear centuries la te r  
in United States a n t i t ru s t  policy." ( Ibid.. p 33).
English guilds "turned to the s ta te  to secure an enforceable  
monopoly franchise." ( Ibid.). Western European governments then 
began to charter  guilds and, as a result  of the l im ite d  access 
afforded persons seeking membership in the guilds, the public had 
l i t t l e  choice but to pay high prices fo r  goods and services  
provided by these sta tutory  monopolies, ( ibid.).
The common law courts again responded to the public outcry  
over poor quality goods and high prices in two ways, as Rubin 
writes:
F irst ,  the courts evolved the doctrine that  
certain occupations and businesses enjoy a 
special re lat ionship w ith  the public founded 
on the ind ispenslb i l i ty  of the service  
performed and the existence of a monopoly 
in i ts  provision. Where such factors were  
present, the a c t iv i ty  was considered to be a 
"public calling," on which the courts  
imposed an obligation to provide competent  
service at a reasonable price. Second, the 
courts came to id en t i fy  certa in  "skil led  
callings" — occupations in which the 
prac t i t io ner  was possessed of special
training and represented to have special  
sk i l l .  i f  the service was performed  
negligently or, la te r ,  simply w ithout the 
requis ite  standard of profic iency,  an action  
in damages was authorized. ( Ibid.).
The guilds were exempt from the obligations imposed by the 
courts on nonregulated occupations because they were chartered  
by the s ta te  and carr ied the presumption of s ta te  regulation of 
the ir  a c t iv i t ie s .  T h i s i s  l ike the federal a n t i t ru s t  exemption fo r  
state  regulated occupations today. As a resu lt ,  the guilds 
remained strong unti l  the dawn of the Industrial  Revolution, 
( ibid.. p 34). The guild system broke down as the middle class 
grew, as knowledge arid technology made many practices of the 
guilds obsolete, as new or special ized occupations eclipsed the 
guild structure,  end as philosophical and economic forces merged 
to overcome the system. ( Ibid.).
As nations industr ia l ized  and d ivers i f ied  th e i r  economies, 
att i tudes about the ind iv idual ’s r ights in society changed. As an 
example, in the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson spoke of 
" l i fe ,  l ib e r ty  and the pursuit  of happiness," not the Locke t r in i t y  
of l i f e ,  l iber ty  and property. The phrase “pursuit of happiness" 
appears in Locke’s "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding" 
(1590):
As therefore the highest perfection of 
in te l lec tua l  nature l ies  in a careful and 
constant pursuit of true and solid  
happiness; so the care of ourselves, that we 
mistake not imaginary fo r  real happiness, 
is the necessary foundation of our l iberty .
The stronger t ies  we have to an unalterable  
pursuit of happiness in general, which is 
our greatest good . . . the more we are free  
from any necessary determination of our 
w i l l  to any p a r t ic u la r  action. (Erler ,  p 50).
For Locke, the “pursuit of happiness,' as Er le r  maintains, is 
“in t im a te ly  connected w ith  the r ight to property." Further,  as 
Locke argues in The Reasonableness of C h r is t ia n i ty. “Mankind" 
must be allowed to pursue happiness and cannot be hindered from  
doing so. ( Ibid.).
Relating the r ight  of se l f -p re se rv a t io n  to the r ight to the 
pursuit of happiness, Leo Strauss wrote:
The form er is the r ight to subsist ' and 
implies the r ight to what is necessary to 
man's being; the second is the right to 
enjoy the conveniences of l i f e '  or to 
'comfortable preservation* and implies,  
therefore,  also the r ight to what is useful 
to man's being w ithout being necessary fo r  
i t .  ( Ibid.. p 51).
E r le r  m a in ta in s  the r i g h t  to  p ro p e r ty  and the r i g h t  to the 
p u rs u i t  o f  happiness are derivat ive  of the right to l i f e ,  and, 
therefore “the right to property end the r ight to the pursuit of 
happiness must be accorded the status of natural rights." Locke, 
in contrast,  maintained that the pursuit of happiness,' implies a 
"right to possess beyond what is necessary fo r  mere l i fe"  and "is 
also the ground of p o l i t ica l  l iberty." The desire to pursue "true 
and solid happiness as the greatest good," is proof fo r  Locke that
"the human mind is not determined and that human beings are free  
to choose the means —  reason —  of securing th e ir  happiness." 
( ibid.).
In the po l i t ic a l  context,  th is natural  
freedom means that "consent of the 
governed is the necessary requis ite  fo r  
le g i t im a te  government. This means
that c iv i l  society must, above a l l ,  provide 
the security  fo r  the external goods —  in 
Lockean terms "properties —  necessary fo r  
the pursuit of happiness." ( Ibid.).
James Wilson w rote  in 1774 that  ‘ a l l  men are, by nature,  
equal and . . . a l l  law fu l  government is grounded on the consent 
of those who are subject to i t .  such consent was given w ith  a 
view to ensure and to increase the happiness of the governed, 
above what they could enjoy in an independent and unconnected 
state of nature." ( Ibid.).
To the Framers, the rights of property and the property in 
rights was central to the U.S. Constitution. In Federal ist  No. 1, 
Hamilton, fo r  example, argued the Constitution was “additional  
security, which i ts  adoption w i l l  a fford to the preservation of 
republican government, to l ib e r ty  and to property." (Kammen, p 
1).
In Federal is t  No. 2, Jay pointed to the in te rest  that members 
of the 1 7 7 4 -1 7 7 5  Continental Congress had in “public l iber ty  and 
prosperity" in arguing that “to preserve and perpetuate i t ,  (s ic)  
was the great object of the people in forming [the Constitutional]  
Convention." ( Ibid.). The American concept of property as
engendered in the 1789 Constitut ion is broader than the 
comprehensive view Locke had of property re fe rr ing  “not so much 
to things in themselves but to the act or conditions of 
possession." ( Ibid.. p 8).
During most the 18th century the moral ju s t i f ic a t io n  for  
private property sh if ted  from that of natural law towards a 
theory demonstrating i ts  h is tor ica l  origins. The key tex ts  of the 
former being Locke's Second T re a t is e  (1 6 8 9 ) ,  Francis Hutcheson’s 
Short Introduction to floral Philosophy (1 7 4 7 )  and A System of 
floral Philosophy (1 7 7 5 )  and those of the l a t t e r  being Adam 
Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence (1 7 6 2 ,  1766) and John Mil lar 's  
Of the Origin of the Dist inct ion  of Ranks (17 71 ) .  ( Ibid.).
Both sides in the debates over the 1789 Constitution were  
concerned about property and the new government. How the new 
government viewed property is expressed in the opinion of Justice  
Paterson in the case of Vanhorne s Lessee v Dorrance (1795):
[T]he right of acquiring and possessing 
property and having i t  protected is one of 
the n a tu ra l ,  in h e re n t  and una l ienab le  r ig h t s  
of man. ( Ibid.. p 9).
The Records of the Federal Convention are s i lent on the 
status and protection of property per se, as Kammen maintains.  
( Ibid.). Kammen argues that as a consequence:
Equally s ignficant,  and perhaps even more 
so, the Preamble to the Constitution —  its  
clearest statement of underlying 
assumptions and values —  never mentions
property. I t  does mention l ib e r ty  and 
jus t ice ,  of course, as w el l  as domestic  
t ranq u il i ty .  We know that  many of the 
Framers believed that  domestic t ra n q u i l i ty  
depended upon the contentment contingent  
upon a widespread and roughly equal 
dis tr ibut ion  of property. I f  the Lockean 
vision conflated most other values under an 
expansive conception of “property," then 
perhaps the Framers were less than f u l l -  
blooded Lockeans. We cannot be sure; but 1 
regard i t  as a poss ib i l i ty  that  requires  
serious consideration. ( Ibid.).
The other thread running through the fabr ic  of the American  
Constitution is the concept of l iber ty .  As the progenitor of the 
Constitution, the Declaration of Independence is a succinct  
expression of the social contract that forms “the leg it im a te  
foundation of c iv i l  society." (Er le r ,  p 46).  The Declaration's  
“se l f -e v id en t  t ru th '  that “al l  men are created equal" has as i ts  
source the "laws of nature and nature s God" and is the ground for  
poli t ica l  m ora l i ty  in this country. ( Ib id .).
Erler  maintains that humans are a s e l f -d i re c te d  species 
having no natural ru lers and possessing the a b i l i ty  to choose 
the ir  own destiny, and as a consequence “human beings are 
capable of individual self-consciousness and, although a member 
of a species, can see themselves as individuals w ith in  the 
species.- The ir  minds are, according to Erler,  not determined and 
and are equal. There are no natural ru lers,  and therefore l iber ty  
is the inexpungable concomitant of equality.  ( Ibid ).
At the core of the American Revolution is the re jec t io n  of 
the notion of the "divine r ight of kings." Modern notions of l i f e ,  
l ib e r ty  and property f low  n atura l ly  from human equality ,  Erler  
contends. These are individual r ights "known to the social  
contract philosophers as "natural rights" — the d ic ta tes  of the 
"laws of nature and nature's God." ( Ib id .. p 47).
At the heart of the Declaration of Independence is the be l ie f  
that "the r ights of man derived not indeed from any p ar t ic u la r  
constitut ion or posit ive law ,  but from . . . the laws of nature and 
nature s God that set the standards and bounds of c iv i l  society,  
and made possible not only a government derived from the 
principles of human nature, but a form of government that could 
honor human nature." ( Ibid.).
The principle embodied in the American Revolution of the 
natural equality of ell  human beings shook the world order, 
especially that in Europe, changing the relationship between the 
governing e l i tes  and the governed In contrast to the Declaration  
of Independence, the Magna Carta was not a natural rights  
document. Instead, i t  was a product of Br it ish  history,  resulting  
irorn a struggle between King and nobles. I t  did not declare the 
universal r ights of man, as did the Declaration of Independence. 
(Erler,  p 49).  A.E. Dick Howard maintains the dra f te rs  of the 
Magna Carta “were rebelling against the abuse of royal power," 
and did not seek “to remake the fabric  of feudal society" but 
ra ther “to restore customary l im i ts  on the power of the Crown."
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During the stormy debates at the Constitutional Convention, 
the A n t i fe d e ra l is ts  feared class c o n f l ic t  result ing from the 
property of the low er  classes being increasingly at r isk and 
argued the “proposed Constitution offered prosperity at the price  
of l iberty ."  (Kammen, p 10). In contrast,  Madison contended in 
Federalis t  No. 10 that property r ights developed from "the 
divers i ty  in the fac u l t ies  of men." ( Ibid.). Kammen maintains  
that "Madison proclaimed the unequal d is tr ibut ion  of property to 
be so long-standing in nature as to be normative; and he concluded 
w ith  the judgment that ‘a rage . . . fo r  an equal division of
property" would be a "wicked p r o j e c t /  though one that was less 
l ike ly  to ar ise w ith in  the extended sphere of the newly proposed 
government." ( Ibid.. p 11).
Madison believed government was inst i tu ted  to protect  
property and to achieve that purpose he advocated that propertied  
persons serve in public off ices. ( Ibid.. c it ing Federal ist  No. 54).  
Madison, however, expanded the meaning and scope of property in 
his essay “Property" published on March 29, 1792, in The National  
Gazette:
In i ts  larger and ju s te r  meaning, [property! 
embraces every thing to which a man may 
attach a value and have a right; and which 
leaves to every one else the l ike advantage.
In the form er sense, a man’s hand, or 
merchandise, or money is called his 
property.
in the l a t t e r  sense, a man his property in 
his opinions and the free communication of 
them.
He has a property of peculiar  value in his 
religious opinions, and in the profession  
and practice d ic tated  by them.
He has property very dear to him in the 
safety and l ib e r ty  of his person.
He has an equal property in the free use of 
his fac u l t ies  and free  choice of the objects  
on which to employ them.
In a word, as a man is said to have a right  
to his property, he may be equally said to 
have a property in his rights. ( Ibid.).
Thus, Madison painted an expansive view of property which 
included the right to choose and practice a profession or other  
calling. As Madison argued, i f  the purpose of government was to 
protect property and the r ights in property and i f  one's occupation 
was a property r ight ,  the government and the Constitution which 
created i t  protected the right to practice an occupation of one's 
choosing.
Very early in American history fo llowing the Declaration of 
independence in 1776, private  property enjoyed a high degree of 
sanctity.  Later, beginning roughly in 1837, the regard for  private  
property became tempered “bu growing recognition of the public 
in terest  as a c o l le c t iv i ty ,  and by negative experiences w ith  
monopolies and corporations that served the needs of an e l i te  few  
ra ther than the democratic m any /  (Kammen, p 15).
Madison viewed the r ight  to property ’ in i ts  fu l l  p o l i t ica l  
sense —  as a fence to l i f e  and l iberty ."  (Erler ,  p 58). Erler  
points out that Madison ‘ did not, any more than Locke, posit an 
absolute r ight to property; the r ight  to property was ju s t i f ie d  in 
purely p o l i t ica l  terms, i.e., in terms of the common good." ( Ibid.).
To Madison, the ‘ regulation of the various and in ter fer ing
in terests  form the principal task of modern legislation." ( Ibid.).
Erler argues this means that "property can be regulated from the,
• -
point af v iew of maintaining a free economy as a fence to l ib e r ty ’ 
because, as he contends, " it  is the fence to Uhe] consent iof the 
governed]." ( Ibid.).
In contrast,  Je f fe rso n ’s l ibera l  view of property was shaped 
more by Scottish communitarianism than Lockean individualism  
and by "his understanding of the requirements of republican 
government and his v iew of human nature." (Yarbrough, p 65).  
Yarbrough argues that “Je f fe rso n ’s republicanism was tempered by 
his commitment to the principles of l ibera l  democracy." ( Ibid.).
Jefferson maintained that "the right to p ro p e r ty  is founded 
on certa in  natural wants, in the means by which we are given to 
sat is fy  those wants, and the right to what we acquire by these 
means, w ithout v io lat ing the s im i la r  r ights of other sensible 
beings." ( Ibid.. p 69).  Yarbrough contrasts the views of property  
Madison and Jefferson held:
Whereas Madison saw the rights of property  
originating in men's unequal facu lt ies  
alone, and believed that society's f i r s t  task
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Jefferson believed that property was
grounded in two conf l ic t ing  natural  
principles: men's equal wants and th e i r
unequal ta len ts  fo r  sa t is fy ing  these needs, 
i t  is th is need to s t r ik e  a balance between  
these two contradictory aspects of human 
nature, ra ther  than the mistaken be l ie f  that  
property is merely conventional,  which  
gives Jefferson's  understanding of property  
i ts  d is t in c t iv e  character.  (Emphasis 
original) .  ( Ibid.).
Jefferson believed in the wide d is tr ibut ion  of property in 
society but also advocated that ”[a]s long os property was r ight ly  
used, that is, that i t  promoted industry, government must protect  
i ts  unequal distribution." ( Ibid.. p 71).  In viewing America as a 
middle class society in which class co nf l ic t  is muted, Jefferson  
"believed in the power of in s t i tu t io n s  and the environment to 
shape human character." ( Ibid.. p 73)
Jefferson maintained that  American republican inst i tu t ions  
unleashed "new opportunities fo r  self-development" by "affording  
each individual the equal opportunity to pursue his own 
happiness." ( Ibid.). He "chose to extend the rights of persons at 
the expense of property" and believed "polit ica l  part ic ipat ion  and 
civic s p ir i t  were too important to be sacr if iced  to the rights of 
property." ( Ibid.. pp 74 ,  75).
Indeed, Jefferson "saw a powerful connection between one 
kind of property, land, one way of l i f e ,  farming, and the 
perpetuation of republican virtue." ( ibid.. p 76). This view is 
consistent w ith  that of the French Physiocrats, who maintained
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that " it  was pr inc ipa lly  nature, and not labor, which supplied the 
m ater ia ls  fo r  human prosperity." ( ibid.. p 78).
Locke disagreed w ith  this v iew, arguing that ”ie]verything of 
value derives from man's labor, that is his transformation of 
nature" and that the "right to property is u l t im a te ly  grounded in 
each ind iv idual ’s original Property in his own person" w ith  labor  
being "merely an extension of that original property." (Erler,  p 
53). According to Locke.
Though the Earth, and al l  in fe r io r  Creatures  
be common to all Men, yet every Man has a 
Property in his own Person. This no Body 
has any Right to but himself .  The Labour of 
his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may 
say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he 
removes out of the State that Nature hath 
provided, and l e f t  i t  in, he hath mixed his 
Labour w ith ,  and joyned to i t  something 
that is his own, and thereby makes i t  his 
Property. . . . For th is Labour being the
unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no 
man but he can have the r ight to what that  
is once joyned to, at least where there is 
enough, and as good le f t  in common for  
others. ( Ib id .. pp 5 2 - 5 3 ,  quoting Locke s 
Second T r e a l is e , p 27).
Jefferson, in his la te r  w r i t in gs ,  repudiated Physiocratic  
theory, conceding the value of labor in the production of wealth.  
(Yarbrough, p 78). Jefferson defended on moral grounds one form  
of labor especia lly ,  that being farming, because he "believed that  
the preservation of republican government depends p r im ari ly  upon 
the character of the people" and, as he maintained, "[algriculture
was important because i t  helped to mold that character .0 ( ibid.. p 
79).
Je f fe rso n ’s republicanism demonstrated fa i th  in the common 
people and in the tempering e f fe c t  republican ins t i tu t ion s  would 
have on human nature. Like Locke and Madison, though, Jefferson  
"believed that  men entered into society to secure th e ir  property  
as wel l  as th e i r  persons, and that  the protection of property was 
a le g i t im a te  concern of society." ( ibid.. p 69).
influenced by natural r ights jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme 
Court a f t e r  the Civil  War began to const i tu t iona l ize  "freedom of 
economic enterpr ise as one of the r ights to be protected against  
the state." (Antieau, p 165). As an example, the high court in the 
1897 case of A l lgeyer v Louisiana described this right as "one of 
those inalienable r ights re la t ing  to persons and property that are 
inherent, although not expressed in the organic law." ( ibid.).
In the Slaughter House Cases, the four dissenting just ices  
maintained that the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution  
protected freedom of enterprise as a natural right of free men, 
and in a concurring opinion in the Butchers Union Case, three 
just ices argued "[tine right to fo l low  any of the common 
occupations of l i f e  is an inalienable right" protected under the 
14th Amendment, ( ibid.. p 166).
As to inherent r ights which must be protected, Justice  
Field, who concurred in the Butchers Union Case, wrote.
Among these inalienable r ights . . .  is the 
right of men to pursue th e i r  happiness, by 
which is meant the r ight to pursue any
law fu l  business or vocation, in any manner 
not inconsistent w i th  the equal r ights of 
others, which may increase th e i r  prosperity  
or develop th e ir  fac u l t ies ,  so as to give 
them th e ir  highest enjoyment, ( ibid.).
In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that "as an 
aspect of l ib e r ty  there is freedom in the individual to develop his 
ta lents  and to pursue the ends he deems f i t t in g  subject,  as in the 
case of other consti tut ional  l ib e r t ie s ,  to res tra in ts  necessary to 
protect the common weal." ( Ibid.. p 167).
In a 1957 case, the Court held that "[a] State cannot exclude 
a person from the pract ice  of law  or from any other occupation in 
a manner or for  reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Certa in ly,  the 
practice of law is not a m a t te r  of the State 's grace." ( Ibid.).
Modern legal theorists  have, in large measure, discarded the 
natural r ights view of l ib e r ty  and property in favor of a more 
p os it iv is t  perception of those concepts. Robinson maintains that  
"the ' re a l is t '  tenor of modern thought is hostile to the idea of 
natural law," and " Iwjhile  some rights may be ‘fundamental' in 
something approaching a higher law conception, the source of 
most r ights is nothing more exalted than the changing secular  
convenience of the state." The result  is that although the 
strength of r ights has diminished, the scope of rights has 
broadened. The evolution of r ights has “introduced a fresh source 
of uncerta inty and controversy into the def in it ion  of rights for  
purposes of constitut ional due process" w ith  “the Supreme Court's
melding of nonconstitutionai sources of r ights creation with  
consti tut ional  def in i t ion  of r ights protection." (Robinson, p 102).
Scholars cred it  the New Deal as the beginning of this new
era in American const i tu t iona l ism . (Kammen, p 16). Those who
urged the new approach to American constitut ional law contended 
that "the protection of property must be ju s t i f ie d  by u t i l i ta r ia n  
considerations, that  social needs should a f fe c t  our decisions 
pertaining to property r ights ,  end that individual in terests  ought 
to prevail only where they enhance the general interest."  ( ibid.).
To Kammen, th is changed.approach to constitutional r ights  
is "not e n t i re ly  new," maintaining that the new emphases "are
consistent w ith  the Preamble to the United States Constitution"  
and "James Madison's prescription fo r  wise and jus t  governments: 
namely, that  they must "equally respect the rights of property,  
and the property in rights.*" ( Ibid.).
Debate over the extent of regulation of licensed professions 
centers on the argument that "[plroperty rights exist at the 
expense of human rights; human rights therefore can be protected  
only to the extent that the r ight to property is diminished or 
extinguished." (Erler ,  p 44).  To protect the dignity of individuals  
living in a c iv i l  society, Er le r  concludes " it  is necessary fo r  the 
rights of the community to assume p r io r i ty  over individual  
rights." This in i t s e l f  requires a modified view of the proper 
re lat ionship of individual and s ta te ." (Emphasis original).  ( Ibid.). 
I t is against this evolving concept of property that the public 
in terest  and need fo r  regulation of licensed professions is 
explored in the next section from d i f fe re n t  perspectives.
i I . Rationales for  State Regulation of Professions.
A. From an Economic Perspective .
State  leg is la tures  are typ ica l ly  convinced to regulate a 
p ar t ic u la r  profession by the argument that regulation w i l l  raise  
the quali ty  of services the profession provides the public. This  
is accomplished by providing "a standard by which professional  
competence may be judged helping to avoid negative third party  
e ffe c ts  which may result  from incompetent practit ioners" and by 
providing "a higher standard of quality." (Carroll  and Gaston, p 
959).
Typ ica l ly ,  occupational licensing laws "attempt to increase 
the quali ty  of inputs (qua l i f ica t ions  of entrants into the 
profession or trade) in the be l ie f  that this w i l l  a l te r  the quality  
of services actually  received by the consumer," even though i t  is 
doubtful th is actual ly  increases the “quality  of services actually  
received by the consumer." ( Ibid.. p 960).
In general, licensing is “a form of monopoly created by entry  
restr ic t ions,"  the implications of which are analyzed w ith in  that  
framework. ( Ibid.). Faith and Toll ison maintain that "licensing is 
an important application of the theory of economic regulation,  
and i t  is standard to analyze such regulation in terms of groups 
using the p o l i t ica l  process to increase th e i r  wealth through 
a r t i f i c ia l  res tr ic t ion s  on competit ion in th e i r  occupation." (Faith  
and Tol l ison ,  p 232).
While pract i t ioners ,  according to Faith and Toll ison, want to 
re s t r ic t  entry into th e i r  profession and control prices, the state
determines the extent of the monopoly r ights i t  grants to a 
licensed profession, f i r s t ,  by "the degree of po l i t ica l  competition  
for  the r ight to supply monopoly p r iv i leg es , '  and, second, by "the 
proportion of market demand of the regulated service accounted 
fo r  by government o f f ic ia ls ."  ( Ibid.).
As to the f i r s t  variable ,  government o f f ic ia ls ,  especially in 
nations where there is no democracy and a strong command 
economy, “stronger monopoly r ights w i l l  be obtained when the 
state has more enforcement power and l i t t l e  pol i t ica l  
competit ion prevails fo r  the r ight  to supply monopoly rights." 
( Ibid.). As to the second variable,  s ta te  o f f ic ia ls  face a dilemma: 
they face a t ra d e -o f f  in " their  dual role as consumers of 
regulated services and suppliers of regulation." ( ibid.).
To determine when government w i l l  regulate, Faith and 
Toll ison maintain that  "[i]f  government buyers are not in the 
market,  i t  always pays them to regulate." ( Ibid.. p 234).  In this  
instance, governments capture "the relevant monopoly rents and 
bear no direct costs of monopolization." ( Ibid.). They point out 
that " if  the government demand curve l ies to the le f t  of the 
market marginal revenue curve, the government gains from 
regulation." ( Ibid.. fn 5). On the other hand, i f  the “government 
buyers are the only buyers in the market,  i t  never pays them to 
regulate because of the fa m i l ia r  w e l fa r e - t r ia n g le  loss." ( ibid.).
To determine when government w i l l  regulate an occupation, 
the argument is:
Other things equal, an increase in aggregate 
private demand w i l l  make i t  more l ike ly
that government w i l l  regulate the 
occupation. In sum, i f  the
occupation/industry in question is 
constant-cost and price d iscr im inat ion is 
not possible, there ex ists  some c r i t ic a l  
market share of output bought by 
government, such that  fo r  values greater  
than this c r i t ic a l  value government w i l l  not 
regulate and fo r  values below i t  government 
w i l l  always regulate. ( Ib id .. p 235).
Two assumptions are necessary in examining the increased 
costs associated w ith  the decision of government to regulate or 
to encourage competit ion in a p ar t ic u la r  occupation: f i r s t ,  "if
government creates a monopoly from which i t  buys as a 
monopsonist, we assume that government wins the b i la tera l  
bargaining process that ensues (Faith and Toll ison contend this  
means that "the monopoly w i l l  be constrained to sell  i ts  output at 
marginal cost"), and, second, "we assume that i f  government acts 
as a monopsonist (imposes marginal cost pricing),  i t  determines  
price fo r  the ent ire  market.” ( Ibid.. p 235).
If  government is the only buyer in the market. Faith and 
Toll ison maintain that "the government w i l l  both monopolize and 
require cost pricing" and that “[p lro f i t -m ax im izo t ion  implies th a t  
the monopolist w i l l  produce the competit ive output and receive  
the p ro f i ts  implied by increasing marginal costs because the 
l icensed monopolist is forced to price at marginal cost." ( ibid.. 
pp 2 3 5 -2 3 6 ) .
The consequences of this are summarized as follows:
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in sum, I f  the Industry in question is 
characterized by increasing costs and price 
discr im ination is not possible, then: a) i f
government comprises none of the market  
fo r  the output, government w i l l  regulate; b) 
i f  government comprises al l  of the market,  
government w i l l  regulate by forcing the 
industry to produce at the competit ive  
solution (P = MC) and in addit ion w i l l  sell  
l icenses to capture the producer surplus at  
this output; c) fo r  cases in between,  
government w i l l  a lways sell  l icenses to 
capture the p ro f i t  that  ex ists  at all levels  
of output because of the r is ing supply 
curve, and as government purchases reach 
some c r i t ic a l  market share, government 
w i l l  also specify the industry’s pricing  
policy. I f  price d iscr im inat ion  is possible, 
government w i l l  a lways regulate by forcing  
the industry to sell  to government at 
marginal cost,  le t t in g  the monopolist be 
unconstrained w ith  respect to the 
remainder of the market and charging a 
l icense fee to capture the p ro f i t  associated  
w ith  to ta l  output. ( Ib id.. p 237) .
Analyzing licensing from another economic perspective, we 
see th a t  barriers to entry of an occupation, l ike l i c e n s i n g ,  “create  
windfa l l  gains (rents)" and these prospective rents prov ide an 
"important impetus fo r  l icensure” w ith  the threat  of loss of rents 
"a m ajor  reason why removal of l icensure is so strongly resisted  
by members of a l icensed profession." (Benham, p 14).
Another economic ra t ionale  fo r  l icensing of occupations is 
engendered under the "public in terest"  theory which assumes 
"’that regulation is established largely in response to public-  
in te re s t - re la te d  o b jec t ives ’ as screened through and advocated by
agents l ike  public in te res t  groups and entrepreneurial  
p o l i t ic ia ns . '  (Heffron, p 150).
Heffron defines the ra t ionale  behind government regulation  
of occupations in the context of the conclusion in Cushmans 
study, The Independent Regu la to ry Commissions, that ' the  old 
style economic regulatory agency was created to solve major  
economic problems and that Congress acted largely w ith  the 
public in te res t  at heart in passing enabling legislation.*  ( ibid.).
A major purpose in creating a commission 
was to provide machinery to secure the 
accurate and expert information necessary 
to the solution of that (economic) problem.
( i b i d ).
To Chicago school theor is t  and federal appeals Judge 
Richard Posner, economic regulation ’ may be in i t ia ted  to serve 
the public in terest  function of re d is tr ib u t iv e  taxation; regulation  
permits internal subsidies which compel 'the provision of certain  
services in quantit ies and at prices that a free market would not 
offer.'" ( Ibid.).
In contrast,  advocates of the "industry protection" theory of 
economic regulation maintain that "the industry i t s e l f  desires 
regulation in order to protect the established producers and l im i t  
entry by others." ( Ibid.). At one extreme, Gabriel Kolko argues 
that “the act sett ing up the In te rs ta te  Commerce Commission was 
sought mainly by ra i lroad executives to protect th e ir  own 
in te res ts  in an increasingly unstable economic environment." 
Kolko maintains that because the "railroads pr im ar i ly  wanted
protection w ith  a minimal amount of r e g u la t io n /  the result  was 
' the  In te rs ta te  Commerce Act was very weak and contained very 
few  provisions requiring competit ion among the established  
ra i l r o a d s /  ( Ibid.).
Under James Q. Wilson s “p o l i t ics  of regulat ion- approach to 
the theory behind old s ty le  economic regulation, regulation is 
broken down into an analysis of th e i r  re la t iv e  costs and benefits,  
which may or may not be monetary and which may be widely or 
narrowly distr ibuted. In the context of occupational licensing,  
Wilson believes c l ien t  p o l i t ics  emerge w ith  regulatory policy 
involving most professional l icensing "very s im i la r  to the 
industry protection origin theory; the small ,  iden t i f iab le  group 
that is l ik e ly  to benefi t  from the regulation or subsidy or entry 
re s tr ic t io n  w i l l  organize to push fo r  i ts  passage." The result  is 
that “since costs are dispersed, no single individual is strongly  
affected and l i t t l e  opposition to the creation of the regulation  
occurs." ( Ibid.. pp 1 5 0 -1 5 1 ) .
Determining the demand fo r  regulatory services, which is a 
public good, determines the extent to which an occupation should 
be regulated. Public choice theoris ts ,  l ike Buchanan, Downs, 
Lindblom, Olson, and Tullock, believe demand can be determined by 
the extent to which "people in government aim to maximize th e ir  
personal advantage." (Reynolds, p 344) .  To Niskanen, demand is 
measured by the extent to which the bureaucrat seeks “to 
maximize the budget" fo r  the 8gency, which i t s e l f  is ‘ determined 
by bargaining between the bureau and the legislature." ( Ibid.. p 
345).
In e i th e r  event, the optimal production level of the public 
good ( i .e .,  regulatory services) is the level where maximum public 
(consumer) sa t is fac t ion  is reached. ( Ibid.. p 340).  I f  this public 
good is underproduced, "the marginal u t i l i t y  yielded by the last  
increment of resources devoted to public goods is greater than 
the marginal u t i l i t y  of the las t  increment devoted to private  
goods." ( Ibid.. pp 3 4 0 -3 4 1 ) .  In th is event, consumer sat is fact ion  
is increased by sh if t ing  responsib i l i ty  fo r  regulation of an 
occupation from the pr ivate  sector (i.e., professional association  
regulation) to the public sector (i.e., s ta te  regulatory boards), i f ,  
however, th is public good is overproduced, regulation should sh if t  
from the public to the private  sector. ( Ibid.. p 341).
B. From a Legal Perspective.
Regulation of professions began in earnest in the 1870s 
fo llowing e a r l ie r  regulatory e f fo r ts  and a period of la is s e z - fa ire  
values. (Rubin, p 35). Rubin traces the development of regulation  
of professions "when graduate professional programs began to 
coalesce into national professional associations," among the f i rs t  
being the American Medical Association. ( Ibid.).
Para l le l  to the development of regulation over professions 
was the s h i f t  from ’ natural r ights to p os it iv is t  perspective in 
the law" in in terpreting the concepts of l iber ty  end property. 
(Robinson, pp 8 6 -8 7 ) .
Robinson maintains that in the ’ modern p os it iv is t  state  the 
individual s t i l l  has claims against the s ta te ,  but increasingly the
claims do not rest on natural r ight  embedded in the social 
contract; they derive from social conventions as embodied in laws 
enacted or recognized (as in the common law )  by the state." 
( Ibid.. p 87).  The p o s i t iv is t  approach “has diminished the strength  
of r ights ,  but i t  has also broadened th e ir  scope." ( ibid.. p 102).
Balanced against the property r ight  to practice a profession 
is the protection of the public in te rest .  Herring argues that the 
“public in te res t  is the standard that guides the adminis tra tor in 
executing the la w '  as wel l  as being “the verbal symbol designed 
to introduce unity, order, and o b je c t iv i ty  into administration."  
(Herring, p 77).
In licensing occupations, the government "uses i ts  police 
power to enact certa in  s ta tu tes  or regulations designed to 
protect the public's health, safety ,  and welfare."  (Baram, p 63). 
Stated reasons fo r  l icensing occupations include the upholding of 
“the standards of a profession, w ith  the r isk-reduction benefits  
going to the u lt im ate  consumer or recip ient of the professional 
services." ( Ibid.).
Licensing is ju s t i f ie d  ‘ as a means of protecting an unwary 
public from risks by those who are inadequately prepared, 
incompetent, or dishonest." ( Ibid.. p 62). A licensing board 
accomplishes this in two ways: i t  "has the a b i l i ty  to prevent an 
applicant from taking an entrance examination and also has the 
ab i l i ty  of la te r  w ithdrawing the license fo r  conduct that violates  
art icu la ted  cr i te r ia ,"  thereby controll ing a profession, ( ibid.. p
65).
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As evidenced by the United States Supreme Court decision of 
Barsky v Board of Rege n ts , the courts fo r  many years “held that  
the choice of an occupation was a priv i lege,  not a r ight,  and 
therefore was not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." 
( Ibid.). In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has upheld 
occupational licensing as the proper exercise of a s ta te s  
inherent authority  to protect the public health, safety and 
welfare .  ( Ibid.). The boundaries the Supreme Court has set on 
licensing are as follows: “s p e c i f ic i ty  (standards and guidelines a 
board uses in issuing or revoking a l icense),  ra t io n a l i ty  (the 
standard must bear a rat ional re lat ionship to good practice of the 
profession), and fairness (makeup of the board, process of review,  
and so forth)." ( Ibid.).
As an element of the consti tut ional  r ight to due process, a 
licensee or applicant is en t i t led  to notice of disciplinary action  
proposed to be taken and an opportunity to be heard. (Baram, p
66). This includes the right ‘ to present information or evidence, 
and to have the opportunity to rebut opposing witnesses." ( Ib id .). 
To prevent the possib i l i ty  of an alleged incompetent medica l 
prac t i t ioner  continuing to practice pending licensing action, the 
courts permit  the licensing board, fo r  example, to pre l im inar i ly  
suspend the pract i t ioner 's  l icense. ( Ibid.).
Review by the courts of licensing actions “is an essential  
element of the constitut ional r ight of due process, and the courts 
have the authority  to postpone suspension or revocation of a 
license unti l  a proper judic ia l  review can be had.“ ( Ibid.. pp 6 6 -
67).
To control entrance to the profession, the typical licensing 
scheme requires the passing of a licensing board examination. A 
l icensing board "also control[s] the ongoing conduct of those 
already in by the ar t ic u la t io n  of performance c r i te r ia ,  which 
carry the threat  of suspension or revocation of license i f  the 
c r i te r ia  are not met." ( Ibid.. p 67).
C. From a Sociological Perspective.
In his ‘ Social Closure and Occupational Registration,"  
MacDonald maintains that the "concept of social closure is 
closely linked to the study of professional occupations, because 
i t  is those occupations in p ar t ic u la r  which attempt to achieve 
market control and co l lec t ive  social m obil i ty  by this means." 
(MacDonald, p 541 ,  cf. Larson 1977). To MacDonald, the "essence 
of closure is the def in i t ion  of membership at a part icu lar  point in 
t ime, and the sett ing of c r i te r ia  fo r  those who may join  
subsequently." (MacDonald, p 541).
MacDonald points out that i t  was Max Weber who originally  
developed the concept of closure. ( Ibid.. 542).  Weber and his 
fo l lowers employed the concept ‘ as part of an explanation of how 
members of a social s tratum establish and maintain th e ir  status,  
and of how co l lec t ive  social m ob il i ty  is achieved." ( Ibid.. p 541).
in his study of the accounting profession in Britain,  
MacDonald examined whether reg is tra t ion  required by statute  
achieved closure. He showed ‘ how a f te r  decades of attempting to 
achieve reg is tra t ion ,  th is goal was abandoned, partly  because the
costs came to outweigh the rewards and part ly  because a very 
s im i la r  end was achieved by other means." ( Ibid.).
MacDonald concludes that success in achieving closure for  
an occupational group depends, in large measure, on the market  
strength of r iva l  occupational groups and argues the following are 
l ike ly  to be s ign if icant  in gauging whether the attempt at closure 
w i l l  succeed:
*
( i )  The nature of the c l iente le .  I f  the 
c l ien te le  and hence i ts  needs are not 
homogeneous, there w i l l  be a tendency for  a 
varie ty  of forms of practice to develop, 
result ing in an internal s t r a t i f ic a t io n  of 
members and of occupational bodies.
( i i )  The counterpart to ( i )  is the nature of 
occupational knowledge. Given a demand for  
specif ic parts of the occupational sk i l ls ,  i t  
is of importance whether or not those parts  
can be detached (as i t  were),  acquired and 
used by the in form al ly  or p a r t ia l ly  trained.
If  they can, i t  may reinforce the 
p o ten t ia l i ty  fo r  a s t r a t i f ie d  occupation.
( i i i )  H is to r ic a l /c u l tu ra l  antecedents. The 
differences in h is to r ic a l /c u l tu ra l  
development of the parts of the United 
Kingdom permit d i f fe re n t ia l  development of 
occupational organisations on a regional 
basis, which may fo s te r  internal divisions  
other than those of s t ra t i f ic a t io n .  ( Ibid.. p
552)
Confl icts  over the d es irab i l i ty  of reg is trat ion,  MacDonald 
maintains, may arise w ith in  a profession centering "around the 
t ra d e -o f f  that h igh-status members have to make between
exist ing co l lec t ive  social status and future market control: 
re g is tra t io n  has as an immediate consequence the extension of 
membership, which in turn w i l l  give a near-guarantee of monopoly 
but also the possib i l i ty  of a lowering of status (and hence 
rewards) as a resu lt  of association w ith  those of lower
standards.” ( Ibid.). As a resu lt ,  MacDonald contends, there may
be delays in implementing a reg is tra t io n  scheme. ( Ibid.. pp 5 5 2 -
553).
As an a l te rn a t ive  to sta tu tory  reg is tra t ion  ( l icensing) of 
professions, MacDonald argues market control can be achieved 
instead as follows:
(a) The careful building of professional  
organizations w ith  reputations fo r  
competence, probity and respectabi l i ty .
(b) The amalgamation of those
organizations, while  maintaining
reputab i l i ty .
(c) The piecemeal achievement of control by 
obtaining the sta tutory  res tr ic t ion  of 
accountancy functions to members of senior 
professional bodies fo r  an increasing
number and range of organizations; at f i r s t ,  
public u t i l i t i e s  and local authorit ies ,  and 
eventually all public l im ited  companies.
( Ibid.. p 554 ,  cf. ICAEW, 1951, para 92).
The object of closure is to achieve "a degree of market  
control which assures good rewards fo r  all  and, for  those at the 
peak of the occupation, incomes which may well  surpass all other
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professionals." ( ibid.). MacDonald concludes from his study of 
accountants and the concept of social closure that:
(a) That a legal monopoly is the idea l -  
typical achievement and that lesser or de 
facto market control may suff ice ,
(b) That such an examination i l luminates  
the 'tensions and contradictions' . 
inherent in the professional 'project, '  
pursued a s . i t  is in an arena of tension and 
conf l ic t  between groups' . . . and involving  
'boundary w ar fa re  ranging from small local  
skirmishes . . .  to national battles* . . .
(c) That while  the pursuit of reg is tra t ion  
by s ta tu te  exposes part of the 
sta te /p ro fess ion  re lat ionship, there are 
other, less obvious, contacts which may be 
as important,  as they are in the case of 
accountants. ( Ibid.).
I I I .  State Regulation of Physical Therapists .
Using physical therapists as an example of how states have 
regulated occupations, para l le ls  can be drawn between the 
development of property r ights and the evolution of the public 
in te rest  as a constitut ional concept in the United States. The 
batt le  has developed into one over how the two could be 
reconciled, i f  at all .
As government l icensing of occupations developed, the early  
years saw concerns focusing on “protecting the practit ioners  
from being included in undesirable licensure or registrat ion acts." 
(Scully and Barnes, p 22). In those days, there was the danger
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that physical therapis ts  would be included in the regulation o? 
'healing fads and c u l t s /  but fo r  the most part the profession was 
unregulated, ( ibid.).
By the middle of this century s ta te  regulation of physical 
therapis ts  varied great ly  from s ta te  to state .  Two general trends 
among the states developed: one, mandatory practice acts, which 
prohibited practicing physical therapy without a l icense, provided 
that "all persons who wished to engage in the practice of physical 
therapy were required by law  to obtain a license to practice,"  
and, two, permissive practice acts, which did not re s t r ic t  the 
practice of physical therapy to those registered, "permitted the 
use of the t i t l e  of registered physical therapist  (RPT) by 
prac t i t ioners  who had applied fo r  and been granted registration."  
( Ibid.. p 23).
Over the years since the 1950s, mandatory acts have taken 
the place of permissive practice acts "setting forth the legal 
standards fo r  the practice of physical therapy . . . f i r s t  w ith  a 
prescript ive re lationship required between physical therapist and 
physician, and la te r  a re fe r ra l  relationship." ( Ibid.). By 1988, 20 
states had enacted laws perm itt ing  practice without referra l  
(d irect access). ( Ibid.. pp 2 3 -2 4 ) .  Presently, 33 states regulate  
the practice of the profession of physical therapist  assistant  
through “l icensure, reg is tra t io n ,  c e r t i f ic a t io n ,  or a combination 
of these." ( Ibid.. p 24).
In Michigan, the Board of Physical Therapy regulates the 
profession of physical therapy and "was or iginally  formed with  
the enactment of Public Act 164 of 1965" and on September 30,
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1978, "this authority  was trans ferred  to the Public Health Code, 
Public Act 368  of 1978, as amended." (Health Services, p 43).
As defined under the Public Health Code, the practice of 
physical therapy means:
"the evaluation of t reatm ent  of an 
individual by the employment of e f fe c t iv e  
properties of physical measures and the use 
of therapeutic exercises and re h a b i l i ta t iv e  
physical or mental d isab i l i ty .  I t  includes 
treatm ent planning, performance of tests  
and measurements, in te rp re ta t ion  of 
re fe r ra ls ,  instruct ion ,  consultative  
services, and supervision of personnel.
Physical measures include massage, 
m obil izat ion ,  heat, cold, a ir ,  l igh t,  w ater ,  
e le c t r ic i ty ,  and sound." ( Ibid.).
Michigan prohibits physical therapists  from identifying  
underlying medical problems or et io logies,  establishing medical 
diagnoses, or prescribing treatm ent .  (R § 3 3 3 .1 7 8 0 1 (1 ) ) .  Physical 
therapists  are also prohibited from direct  access to patients but 
instead can "engage in the actual treatm ent  of an individual only 
upon the prescription of an individual holding a l icense, other  
than a subfield l icense, issued" to a dentis t ,  a medical doctor, an 
osteopath, or a pod ia tr is t  or "the equivalent license issued by 
another state." (R § 3 3 3 .1 7 3 2 2 ) .
The Board of Physical Therapy has the following as i ts  scope 
of responsibil i ty:
The Public Health Code mandates certain  
responsib i l i t ies  and duties for a health  
professional licensing board. Underlying all
duties is the respons ib i l i ty  of the board to 
promote and protect the public’s health,  
safety ,  and w elfa re .  This responsib i l i ty  is 
implemented by the Board by ascertaining  
minimal entry level competency of health  
pract i t ioners .  The Board also has the 
obligation to take d iscip l inary action  
against l icensees who have adversely 
affected  the public's health, safety ,  and 
w elfare .  ( Ibid.).
The Michigan Board of Physical Therapy consists of f ive  
physical therapists  and two public members, each of whom serves 
a term of four years, ( ibid.). The Board meets every other month, 
and at  meetings the board considers proposed regulations,  
reviews credentials of applicants fo r  licensing examinations,  
discusses pending leg is la t ion  involving the regulation of physical 
therapists and other health care professionals, and sits  as a 
appeals panel in d iscip linary actions.
To show the nature and extent of the Board of Physical 
Therapy's functions, i t  is useful to examine figures for its  
a c t iv i t ie s  fo r  a one-year period. As an example, for the 1988-  
1989 f isca l  year, the last  fo r  which tota l  figures are available,  
the Board's l icensing and regulatory a c t iv i ty  were as follows:
Licensing A c t iv i t y 
Applications Received 381
Examinations Given 175
Licenses Issued
By Exam 275
Oy Endorsement 14
Temporary (Pending Exam) 2 8 8
Number of Licensees 2 ,979
Relicensure 20
Regu la to ry A c t i v i t y 
Allegations Received 2
Adm in is tra t ive  Investigations 3
Adm in is tra t ive  Complaints Filed 0
Field Investigations Authorized 0
Investigations Completed 0
Summary Suspensions Filed 0
Board D isc ip l inary Actions 
Reprimand 0
Probation 0
Fine 0
Limited License 1
Voluntary Surrender 0
Suspension 0
Revocation 0
Total Discipl inary Actions 1
(Source: Ib id .. p 44 )
These f igures would tend to show that the Board is more 
l ike ly  in Michigan to rule on qua li f icat ions to s i t  for  licensing
examinations ra ther  than to s i t  as a hearing board for  
d isc ip l inary  actions against physical therapists.
Emergency rules regarding the testing of applicants 
educated in foreign countries were enacted in Michigan on April  
17, 1990. The Board of Physical Therapy made the following  
finding of emergency in enacting these rules:
These rules are being processed by the 
board of physical therapy fo r  the purpose of 
specifying the requirements for  physical 
therapist  l icenses fo r  applicants who have 
obtained th e i r  education outside of the 
United States or the Dominion of Canada.
The board finds that health care 
ins t i tu t io n s  and agencies throughout 
Michigan are experiencing a c r i t ic a l  
shortage of quali f ied  physical therapy 
personnel and are recru it ing  a signif icant  
number of foreign-educated individuals to 
provide essential  physical therapy services.
Since the board's current rules do not 
specify requirements fo r  applicants  
educated outside the United States or the 
Dominion of Canada, the board finds i t  
necessary to immediate ly  implement rule 
changes to assure quali f ied  applicants are 
granted licenses to practice physical
therapy in Michigan. Therefore, the board
finds that the preservation of the public 
health, sa fe ty ,  and w e l fa re  requires
promulgation of these rules as emergency 
rules w ithout fo l lowing the notice and 
part ic ipat ion  procedures required by 
sections 41 and 42 of Act No. 306 of the 
Public Acts of 1969, as amended, being 
§§24.241 and 24 .242  of the Michigan
Compiled Laws.
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The emergency rules define "completed a physical therapist  
educational program acceptable to the board" as meaning that ‘ the 
applicant has completed a physical therapis t  educational program 
of not less than 120 weeks in duration, in which not less than 60 
weeks are devoted to a professional curriculum which includes, at 
a minimum, studies" in the s c ie n t i f ic  rat ionale of physical 
therapy, biomedical sciences, laboratory experience, physical 
therapy m odalit ies ,  and research methodology, all of which are 
explained in more deta i l  in the emergency rules. (Emergency Rule 
1(c)).
The emergency rules also adopt the standards of American 
Physical Therapy Association (APTA) approved in June 1978. The 
"Standards of Pract ice  fo r  Physical Therapy" established by the 
APTA "describes the conditions and performance that are 
considered by the Association essential fo r  quality physical 
therapy services." (Scully and Barnes, p 24).
As typ ica l ly  a d is t inc t  unit w ith in  a health care fa c i l i t y ,  
the physical therapy department operates w ith in  guidelines 
established by accredit ing agencies l ike  the APTA "on standards 
appropriate to the types of services" rendered. ( Ibid.). C r it ics ,  
however, maintain that "[bloundaries established by law" on the 
practice of physical therapy "have l im ited  the continued 
development of the preventive aspects" of the field. ( Ibid.).
Too often in our h istory,  scenarios have 
developed where part ic ipat ion  by a physical 
therapist  in programs fo r  assessment and
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Whi le sup po r t ing  changes in s ta te  la w s ,  beginn ing w i t h  
Maryland and C a l i f o rn ia ,  p e r m i t t i n g  phys ica l  t h e ra p is t s  to t r e a t  
p a t ie n ts  w i t h o u t  phys ic ian  r e f e r r a l s ,  o th e r  c r i t i c s  m a in ta in  these 
changes " w i l l  p lace a g re a te r  lega l r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  on the [phys ica l  
therapy]  p ro fe ss io n ,  and the p ro fe s s io n  m us t  meet t h is  cha l lenge."  
{Horsh, p 173).
Horsh, in  f a c t ,  argues th a t  a "p r im a ry  method o f  meet ing 
t h is  cha l lenge is  f o r  the p ro fe s s io n  to  take s teps to m in im iz e  the 
p o s s ib i l i t y  t h a t  those in d iv id u a ls  lack ing  the necessary 
knowledge and s k i l l  are a l lov /ed  to p ra c t ic e . "  ( Ib id . ,  pp 1 7 3 - 174 }. 
He urges the " [ e s t a b l i s h in g  o f  s tanda rds"  as one of those steps, 
v Ib id .. p 174).
The standards to w h ich  Horsh re fe rs  are those of the APTA 
w h ich  not on ly  govern "a w ide  range of in d iv id u a l  p r a c t i t i o n e r  
eeiiCiSiiuCc* Li u t a-so tne p r a c t i t i o n e r s  po isons!  G u a l i i io s ,  s c i ii c g ; 
voi : c.u c L. co n s u l ta t io n .  end com m u n i ty  resoon s ib i l  i t  ij. ( l a id .).
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represent the heart of the profession — service to society.  
Further, standards such as these can be expected to a f fec t  
licensure requirements and preparation fo r  entry into the 
profession." ( ibid.).
The standards of professional associations l ike the APTA do 
‘ more to protect the autonomy and survival of the professions 
than the needs of the public." (Schneider, p 479).  E fforts  to 
stream line  and, in some cases, consolidate regulatory agencies 
with in  sta tes  "have been designed to diminish the control of 
professional in te rests  over the boards and to make these agencies 
more accountable public organizations." ( Ibid.).
Confl ic ts  over private  and public r ights are being redressed 
in growing numbers in an t i t ru s t  and malpractice l i t ig a t io n  and by 
professionals who are "enlisting constitutional guarantees and 
adm in is tra t ive  safeguards to n u l l i fy  oppressive entry and 
practice standards promulgated by sta te  licensing boards." 
(Rubin, p 29).  The physical therapist  practicing in Michigan faces 
squarely the issue of the conf l ic t  between private and public 
rights on the question of d irect access. Whether the direct  
access question is addressed in the context of regulatory change, 
professional association rulemaking, or in the courts depends on 
the degree to which the affected in te rest  groups are w il l in g  to 
compromise on questions involving the independence of and 
control over physical therapists.
Conclusion
This paper hos highlighted issues involving private rights  
and public in terests  in regulating occupations l ike physical 
therapists .  In this concluding section, we see that what is really  
at issue w i th  any regulation of an occupation is in re a l i ty  the 
extent to which the profession i t s e l f  demands and makes input 
into the regulatory process. Sunset laws and public members on a 
regulatory board are designed to ensure maximum protection of 
the public in te rest .  (Rubin, pp 3 8 -3 9 ) .
But i t  is the regulated profession i t s e l f  that has the 
m a jo r i ty  of members on a s ta te  regulatory board. Therefore, i t  is 
the profession i t s e l f  that  has an influence, i f  i t  chooses to 
exercise that  influence, on the nature end extent of i ts  own 
regulation by i ts  exercise of any rulemaking authority granted to 
i t  by the leg is la ture .  There is no question that many influences 
af fe c t  the leg is la t ive  regulation of a p art icu lar  occupation, but 
the overriding influence is that  of the regulated profession 
i ts e l f .  ( Ib id . . pp 3 6 - 3 7 ) .  In cases where the interests of 
competing groups are d iv is ive ra ther  than cohesive confl icts over 
rights are resolved u l t im a te ly  in the courts. ( Ibid.. p 43).
In devising licensing schemes over individual occupations, 
the sta tes face the neverending co nf l ic t  between the individual's  
right to practice the occupation and the public interest in 
orotectino societu bu devisino minimum education and practice  
standards.
For the f ie ld  of physical therapy, the debate over whether  
therapis ts  should be allowed d irect  access to patients,  in other  
words, pract ice  w ithout physician re fe r ra l ,  demonstrates how the 
co n f l ic t  between the r ight to practice and the public interest in 
protecting society remains at the forefront over government 
regulation of occupations. Beginning w ith  New York in 1926,  
state l icensing of physical therapis ts  was required in every state  
by 1972. (Burch, p 24).  Direct access was f i r s t  introduced at the
APTA in 1973 and adopted in 1979 by i ts  House of Delegates.
( Ibid.. pp 2 4 -2 5 ) .
To help ensure the competence of physical therapists
practicing w ithout physician re fe r ra l ,  the APTA adopted the 
fo l lowing guidelines fo r  identi fy ing the competencies “that the 
therapist would be required to possess in order to practice’ 
without pr ior  physician re ferra l:
1. The physical therapy curriculm content 
necessary to achieve the identi f ied
competencies fo r  practice independent of 
p rac t i t io n e r  re fe rra l .
2. The revisions necessary to the Standards 
for  Accreditat ion of Physical Therapy 
Education Programs.
3. A proposed time table for the 
accomplishment of curricula changes.
4. A d ra ft  of model leg is la t ive  changes for 
state  chapters. ( Ibid.. p 25).
lechnoioau and c l in ica l  research w i l l  not only continue to 
lead to growth and changes in the f ie ld  of physical therapy i ts e l f  
but w i l l  also lead to changes in the nature of the relationship  
between the patient and the physical therapist .  This w i l l ,  in 
turn, lead to fu r th e r  changes in the way government regulates the 
f ie ld .  (Horsh, p 34).
Horsh, in fa c t ,  maintains that  '[pjhysical therapists who 
occupy managerial and supervisory positions w i l l  be d irectly  
involved' in leg is la t ion  which is rapidly and constantly being 
revised in th is technology-driven profession. ( Ibid.).
In today s regulatory environment, sunset laws have been 
passed in 26 states in “an e f fo r t  by s ta te  leg is la tors  to restore  
accountabil i ty  and operational e f f ic iency  to regulatory agencies 
by means of periodic rev iew , reassessment,  and reform, where 
appropriate. '  (Rubin, p 38).  Under these laws, boards 'whose 
regulatory performance has not measurably served the public 
in te rest  are subject to part ia l  or complete abolit ion. '  ( Ibid.).
As another means of protecting the public interest  in 
regulating professions, laws have been passed in some states,  
including Michigan, requiring the public ( lay)  members be added to 
the regulatory boards. ( Ibid.).
Rubin c ites  the fo l low ing as the impact of sunset laws on 
state and local l icensing boards:
Were sunset the success originally  
envisioned, the s ta te  licensing landscape 
would show signs of s ign if icant  a l terat ion.
It  does not. Nor are the reasons d i f f ic u l t  to 
trace. Allowed to develop in a regulatory
framework largely of th e i r  own making, and 
now in fu l l  command of public health, the 
legal system, f inance, science, and
technology, the professions today are
p o l i t ic a l ly  powerful and entrenched, 
especially at the s ta te  and local levels.  
For many sta te  leg is latures the sunset
process is an uneven contest,  in which 
professional regulation emerges
substantively unscathed and, worse, w ith  
the seal of reform approval.
I f  reform in the public in te rest  tru ly  is to 
occur, many believe the proper avenue is 
not the s ta te  leg is la ture ,  but the federal  
government or the courts. Both
a l te rn at ives  have been resorted to, w ith  the 
one conclusive result  that the law relevant  
to the professions is daily becoming more 
complex. ( Ibid.. p 39).
On both the federal and state  levels, public rights are being 
protected by an t i t ru s t  and civ i l  r ights acts against unlawful  
practices by professionals. In addition, private actions brought 
under these acts seek to redress unlawful acts are sanctioned by 
the award of attorney fees for  "the successful p la in t i f f ."  (Rubin, 
p 43).
As government assumes greater responsibil i ty  for  social 
w elfa re  in the name of the public in terest ,  the law is beginning 
to recognize "an ent i t lem ent to essential professional care and 
service." ( Ibid ). Balanced against this is the "reservoir of private  
rights" in the Consitution, which, as Rubin observes, "protects  
specif ied c iv i l  l ib e r t ie s  against unreasonable government
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Rubin id e n t i f ie s  those c iv i l  l ib e r t ie s  as follows:
Among the freedoms deeply etched in our 
co l lec t ive  conscience is the r ight  to choose 
one's l ivelihood; to hold property and 
reputation in ta c t  against undisciplined  
state  in terference;  to speak, associate, and 
travel f ree ly ;  and to f ind equal and unbiased 
t reatm ent  at the hands of the s ta te  or the 
state 's  m in is ters .  ( Ib id .).
As the forum where the c o n f l ic t  between these private  
rights and the public in te re s t  has been in the forefront ,  the 
courts, led by the United States Supreme Court, have in recent 
years quantif ied the balancing of these in terests  in terms of 
procedural due process. In the 1972 cases of Board of Regents v 
Roth and P erry v Sindermann. the Supreme Court "began 
system at ica l ly  to iden t i fy  state-based 'property' and ' l iberty '  
in te rests  which are en t i t le d  to procedural protections." ( Ibid.. p 
44).
Later,  the high court removed "se lf - in te rested  professional 
boards from the l icensing d iscip linary process," leading to the 
codif ica t ion  of 14th Amendment procedural safeguards in state  
ad m in is tra t ive  procedure acts. ( Ibid.).
Other forms of s ta te  regulation have been stricken down as 
w e l l ,  an example being "absolute sta te  prohibitions on 
professional product (prescription drugs) and service (routine  
legal services) advertising" as vio lat ing what was found to be the 
First  Amendment's guarantee of freedom of commercial speech. 
( Ibid.. p 45).
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Also held i l lega l  by the courts have been regulations  
imposing unduly long residency requirements and those found to 
resu lt  in ‘ overt race, creed, and gender discrimination." ( Ibid.). 
As a resu l t  of c iv i l  r ights l i t ig a t io n  a f f i rm ing  these l ib er t ies ,  
‘ the economic and social barr iers  to professional practice that  
were once prominent in the United S ta te s ’ have been ‘ largely  
erased." ( Ibid.).
The competing in te res ts  that  make up the p lu ra l is t ic  nature 
of government in the United States make i t  highly l ike ly  that in 
the years ahead we w i l l  see e f fo r ts  at deregulation s ta l l .  Rubin 
predicts the fo l lowing in the future:
Substantial deregulation of existing  
professional practice acts by the states  
cannot be ruled out, as the current state  
sunset process reveals. Nor is this ent ire ly  
the fa u l t  of s ta te  o f f ic ia ls .  Although 
consumers clamor today for less state  
control,  they are quite unwill ing to assume 
greater  informational search costs and 
increased risk attending the absence of 
state  l icensing. Registration and 
c e r t i f ic a t io n ,  less re s t r ic t iv e  a lternat ives  
to fu l l  l icensure, simply do not o f fe r  the 
same degree of apparent consumer security,  
nor are they l ike ly  to be to lerated by the 
p o l i t ic a l ly  entrenched professions. More 
l ik e ly  is greater  s ta te  resistance to 
demands fo r  licensing by new professional 
groups, as wel l  as an e f fo r t  by the states  
to relax a rb i t ra ry  practice divisions among 
existing licensed professions. ( Ib id .. pp 
4 6 -4 7 ) .
To gain public acceptance of g rea ter  e f fo r ts  at l icensing  
more professions and of g rea ter  regulat ion in those already 
regulated, l icensing boards must be perceived as acting "in the 
public in te re s t  ob jec t ive ly  and sensit ively."  (Baram, p 70). 
Baram prefers  to have regulatory boards "of public servants who 
are accountable to mutip le  public interests."  ( Ibid.. pp 7 0 -7 1 ) .
He proposes that  th is be done by providing for  
"accountabili ty of board decisions through judicia l  review," by 
screening "potential board members fo r  bias and conflicts," and 
by having “public representat ives serve on such boards, as is done 
in Cali forn ia"  and Michigan. ( Ib id .. p 71).  Baram argues that  
"further  l icensure o f fe rs  an a l te rn a t ive  to risk regulation worthy  
of fu r th e r  consideration, p ar t ic u la r ly  fo r  risk contexts where 
certa in professionals w i l l  play very s ignif icant  roles (examples 
are operators of waste  f a c i l i t i e s  and nuclear power plants, 
transporters of hazardous wastes, and designers of h igh-risk  
products)." ( Ibid.).
Played out in leg is la tures ,  regulatory boards, and courts, 
the co n f l ic t  over private  and public rights is important to the 
future of regulation. I f  balanced heavily in favor of private  
rights,  the regulation of occupations by state  boards becomes 
meaningless and leaves the protection of the public interest to 
the vagaries of the marketplace, which by i t s e l f  w i l l  not work i f  
the public is deprived of su f f ic ien t  information on which to make 
informed judgments about the quality  of services. I f  balanced 
heavily in favor of public r ights,  the regulation of professions in 
terms of entry and conduct could well  become so s t i f l in g  as to
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inh ib i t  in i t i a t i v e  and the freedom to choose an occupation. 
(Rubin, pp 4 3 -4 5 ) .  The challenge c lear ly  is to achieve that  
del icate  balance between private  r ights and the public interest.
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